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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
After a jury had awarded plaintiffs-appellants Khaled 
Abdullah, Audrey James, Eardley James, and Velma George 
damages for injuries sustained during an American Airlines 
flight, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of 
Saint Croix, ordered a new trial. The court's action was 
based on its conclusion that it had improperly relied upon 
territorial common law to establish the standards of care 
that were used by the jury to determine that negligence on 
the part of American Airlines' employees had caused 
appellants' injuries. Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 969 
F. Supp. 337, 340-41 (D.V.I. 1997). The court found that 
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the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 
731, (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. SS 40101-49105) 
(FAA), implicitly preempts territorial standards for aviation 
safety,1 and that the jury should not have been instructed 
on a territorial law standard of care. Abdullah, 969 F. Supp. 
at 341. Concluding that the error regarding federal 
preemption resulted in the admission of evidence on 
standards of care that was not limited to federally 
established standards of care and that this evidence was 
prejudicial, the court ordered a new trial. Id . at 340. At 
plaintiffs' request, the District Court then certified the 
following issue for appeal: 
 
       Does federal law preempt the standards for air safety, 
       but preserve State and Territorial damage remedies? 
 
We will answer both parts of this certified question with 
a "yes." As to the first part of the question, contrary to 
courts that have found that federal law does not preempt 
state and territorial air safety standards, or that federal law 
only preempts discrete aspects thereof, we find implied 
federal preemption of the entire field of aviation safety. As 
to the second part, we conclude that, despite federal 
preemption of the standards of care, state and territorial 
damage remedies still exist for violation of those standards. 
 
Our finding on preemption is based on our determination 
that the FAA and relevant federal regulations establish 
complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and 
international air transportation and that these standards 
are not subject to supplementation by, or variation among, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Subsequent to the trial in the case at bar but prior to the resolution 
of American's post-trial motions, American proceeded with related 
litigation in the Southern District of New York. In that case, the 
District 
Court rejected American's contention that federal law preempts aviation 
safety. Trinidad v. American Airlines, 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
However, after issuing that decision and initially deciding not to certify 
an interlocutory appeal, the District Court issued an Order holding that 
the preemption of aviation safety is an open question which it then 
certified for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. The Second 
Circuit decided not to address the issue at that time. In order to avoid 
duplicative trial costs, all parties then agreed to not try liability and 
to 
be bound by the ultimate liability result in the case pending in the 
Virgin 
Islands. 
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jurisdictions. Thus, we agree with the District Court that it 
was error to rely upon territorial safety standards in 
determining American Airlines' liability in this case. 
 
In coming to our conclusion on preemption, we do not, 
however, agree with the narrow nature of the federal 
standard set out by the District Court. We conclude instead 
that there is an overarching general standard of care under 
the FAA and its regulations. This standard arises in 
particular from 14 C.F.R. S 91.13(a): "No person may 
operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as 
to endanger the life or property of another." Thus, we do 
not agree with the District Court's determination that 
evidence on "reasonable standard of care" should 
necessarily have been excluded -- as long as a "reasonable 
standard of care" is compatible with an avoidance of 
carelessness or recklessness in the operation of the aircraft.2 
We will remand this case to the District Court to review 
both the testimony and the jury instructions on standards 
of care in order to determine if they are consistent with the 
standards we set out here. If they are, the jury verdict 
should be reinstated. If they are not, the District Court 
should proceed with a new trial, and in that trial the court 
should follow the federal standards as we establish them 
here. 
 
I. Background 
 
Plaintiffs Khaled Abdullah, Audrey James, Eardley 
James, and Velma George were passengers on American 
Airlines Flight 1473 from New York to San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, on August 28, 1991. En route, the aircraft 
encountered severe turbulence which caused serious 
injuries to a number of passengers, including the plaintiffs. 
The First Officer had noticed a weather system developing 
in the flight path and had illuminated the seatbelt sign. He 
had also gone to the back of the aircraft to warn the flight 
attendants that the ride could get choppy in ten minutes. 
None of the crew, however, alerted the passengers of the 
expected turbulence. Nor did the pilot change course in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See our discussion at pp. 15-16. 
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order to avoid the storm. Some of the injured passengers 
were wearing their seatbelts; some were not. 
 
Plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits against defendant 
American Airlines, Inc., alleging negligence on the part of 
the pilot and flight crew in failing to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid the turbulent conditions known to 
them and in failing to give warnings reasonably calculated 
to permit plaintiffs to take steps to protect themselves.3 
 
A jury trial commenced on August 7, 1995, in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of Saint Croix. The 
plaintiffs' cases were consolidated for trial. On August 25, 
1995, the jury found American liable, found plaintiffs to be 
without any contributory fault, and awarded monetary 
damages aggregating more than two million dollars. 
 
American filed a post-trial motion which requested 
dismissal and/or a new trial plus attorney's fees and costs. 
Among the grounds asserted was that the District Court 
had improperly used territorial common law to establish 
the standards of care for the pilots, flight attendants, and 
passengers. American argued that the FAA implicitly 
preempts the standards for airline safety. 
 
The District Court issued an Opinion on June 5, 1997, 
holding that the FAA impliedly preempts state and 
territorial regulation of aviation safety and standards of 
care for pilots, flight attendants, and passengers, but that 
plaintiffs may recover under state and territorial law for 
violation of federal standards. Abdullah, 969 F. Supp. at 
341. The District Court held that its error of law regarding 
preemption, which resulted in admission of evidence 
regarding standards other than the federal standards, 
warranted a new trial. 
 
Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified 
this issue for interlocutory review. We granted interlocutory 
review. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The two cases were previously before this Court when American 
petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus to transfer the cases to New York. The 
petition was denied on May 17, 1995. Abdullah v. AMR Corp., 60 F.3d 
813 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court rested on 
diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. S 1332. 
 
We accepted jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b), which permits us to accept an 
interlocutory appeal where there is "substantial ground for 
a difference of opinion" on an issue and "an immediate 
appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination 
of the litigation." 
 
The appeal involves a question of law, so that the 
standard of review is plenary. Epwright v. Environmental 
Resources Management, Inc. Health & Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 
335, 339 (3d Cir. 1996); Epstein Family Partnership v. 
Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The scope of review is not limited to the issues 
articulated in the section 1292(b) certification motion. "As 
the text of S 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies 
to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied 
to the particular question formulated by the district court." 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996). 
"[T]he appellate court may address any issue fairly included 
within the certified order because `it is the order that is 
appealable, and not the controlling question identified by 
the district court.' " Id. (quoting 9 J. Moore & B. Ward, 
Moore's Federal Practice P 110.25[1], p. 300 (2d ed. 1995)). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The power of Congress to preempt state law derives from 
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, 
which provides that the laws of the United States "shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. "Consideration 
of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with 
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'." Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 
                                6 
  
"Accordingly, `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that "despite the variety 
of these opportunities for federal preeminence, we have 
never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state 
regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre- 
emption with the starting presumption that Congress does 
not intend to supplant state law." New York State Conf. of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 654 (1995). The Court in Cipollone stated the test 
for preemption: 
 
       Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the 
       statute's language or implicitly contained in its 
       structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
       U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In the absence of an express 
       congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that 
       law actually conflicts with federal law, see Pacific Gas 
       & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and 
       Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983), or if federal 
       law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field" `as to 
       make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
       room for the States to supplement it'." Fidelity Fed. 
       Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 
       (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
       U.S. at 230). 
 
505 U.S. at 516. 
 
The instant case concerns the species of preemption 
known as field preemption. Field preemption occurs if 
federal law "thoroughly occupies" the "legislative field" in 
question, i.e., the field of aviation safety. The Supreme 
Court has characterized field preemption in this way: 
 
       Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy a 
       given field to the exclusion of state law. Such a 
       purpose properly may be inferred where the 
       pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes 
       supplementation by the States, where the federal 
       interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or where 
       "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law 
       and the character of obligations imposed by it . . . 
       reveal the same purpose." 
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Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) 
(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).4  Thus, implied federal 
preemption may be found where federal regulation of a field 
is pervasive, Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, or where state 
regulation of the field would interfere with Congressional 
objectives. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 
248 (1984). 
 
Our finding of implied field preemption here is based on 
our conclusion that the FAA and relevant federal 
regulations establish complete and thorough safety 
standards for interstate and international air transportation 
that are not subject to supplementation by, or variation 
among, jurisdictions. While some courts have found federal 
law to preempt discrete aspects of air safety, e.g. French v. 
Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); World 
Airways, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 
800 (9th Cir. 1978); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 
F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), we hold that federal law 
establishes the applicable standards of care in thefield of 
air safety, generally, thus preempting the entirefield from 
state and territorial regulation. 
 
In regard, however, to the second part of the certified 
question, although the term "field preemption" suggests a 
broad scope, the scope of a field deemed preempted by 
federal law may be narrowly defined. For instance, in In re 
TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 859 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (TMI II), and In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 
(3d Cir. 1995) (TMI III), we held that federal regulation of 
nuclear safety preempted state tort law on the standard of 
care. Still, even though federal law controlled the standard 
of care, we held that the question whether causation and 
damages were federally preempted was a separate 
consideration. See TMI III, 67 F.3d at 1107. 
 
Similarly, in the instant case, we find that Congress, in 
enacting the FAA and relevant regulations, intended 
generally to preempt state and territorial regulation of 
aviation safety. Nevertheless, we find that plaintiffs may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. State common law rules may be preempted in the same ways as state 
statutes or regulations. Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 
F.2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523). 
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recover damages under state and territorial remedial 
schemes. 
 
In coming to our answers to the certified question, we 
depart from the precedent established by a number of cases 
which hold that federal law does not preempt any aspect of 
air safety. See In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy 
Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1980); Trinidad v. 
American Airlines, 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re 
Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 
1185, 1187 (D. Colo. 1988). As explained below, we find 
these cases to be unpersuasive, either because these courts 
presumed, without deciding through in-depth analysis, that 
the FAA did not preempt state or territorial air safety 
standards, or because these courts followed the preemption 
language of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. 
S 41713(b)(1) (formerly S 1305(a)(1)) (ADA), an economic 
deregulation statute that we find inapposite to resolving 
preemption questions relating to the safety of air 
operations. Cf. Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 
164 F.3d 186, 190-95 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that 
defamation action was not preempted by the ADA because 
it did not involve a regulatory or public utility function). We 
conclude that Congress's intent to preempt state and 
territorial regulations of air safety is not affected by the 
language of the ADA. 
 
A. Federal Preemption of Air Safety Standards 
 
1. Field Preemption 
 
As the District Court set out in its thorough examination 
of the legislative history, the FAA was enacted in response 
to a series of "fatal air crashes between civil and military 
aircraft operating under separate flight rules." United States 
v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) 
(quoting 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3742). Congress's 
purpose in enacting the FAA was "to promote safety in 
aviation and thereby protect the lives of persons who travel 
on board aircraft." In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 
1979, 708 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Rauch v. 
United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
Congress found the creation of a single, uniform system 
of regulation vital to increasing air safety. City of Burbank 
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v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973) 
(noting that "a uniform and exclusive system of federal 
regulation" is required "if the congressional objectives 
underlying the [FAA] are to be fulfilled"); Christensen, 419 
F.2d at 1404 (remarking that "the whole tenor of the [FAA] 
and its principal purpose is to create and enforce one 
unified system of flight rules"). By enacting the FAA, 
Congress intended to rest sole responsibility for supervising 
the aviation industry with the federal government: 
 
       [A]viation is unique among transportation industries in 
       its relation to the federal government--it is the only 
       one whose operations are conducted almost wholly 
       within federal jurisdiction, and are subject to little or 
       no regulation by States or local authorities. Thus, 
       the federal government bears virtually complete 
       responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this 
       industry in the public interest. 
 
S.Rep. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958). 
 
Similarly, the House Report accompanying the FAA 
indicates that one of the purposes of the Act is to give "[t]he 
Administrator of the new Federal Aviation Agency 5 . . . full 
responsibility and authority for the advancement and 
promulgation of civil aeronautics generally, including 
promulgation and enforcement of safety regulations." 
H.R.Rep. No. 2360, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 
3741. In addition, in a letter included as part of the House 
Report, the Airways Modernization Board Chairman wrote: 
"It is essential that one agency of government, and one 
agency alone, be responsible for issuing safety regulations 
if we are to have timely and effective guidelines for safety in 
aviation." Id. at 3761. 
 
Thus, legislative history reveals that Congress intended 
the Administrator, on behalf of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, to exercise sole discretion in regulating air 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Originally called the Federal Aviation Agency, it was later renamed the 
Federal Aviation Administration and made part of the Department of 
Transportation. Department of Transportation Act, Pub.L. No. 89-670, 
SS 3(e)(1), 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. 931, 932, 938 (1966) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
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safety. And this is exactly what Congress accomplished 
through the FAA. Congress enacted Chapter 447, Safety 
Regulation, and directed the Administrator to "carry out 
this chapter in a way that best tends to reduce or eliminate 
the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air 
transportation." 49 U.S.C. S 44701(c). See City of Burbank, 
411 U.S. at 627 (noting that Congress gave the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration "broad 
authority" with respect to air safety standards). 
 
To effectuate this broad authority to regulate air safety, 
the Administrator of the FAA has implemented a 
comprehensive system of rules and regulations, which 
promotes flight safety by regulating pilot certification,6 pilot 
pre-flight duties,7 pilot flight responsibilities,8 and flight 
rules.9 
 
The federal courts that adjudicated the first major cases 
involving the FAA interpreted its legislative history as 
evincing Congress's intent to exercise supremacy over the 
field of aviation safety. For instance, just after the passage 
of the FAA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remarked: 
"The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress for the 
purpose of centralizing in a single authority--indeed, in one 
administrator--the power to frame rules for the safe and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, 14 C.F.R. S 61.3 (1996) provides: 
 
       No person may act as pilot in command, or in any other capacity as 
       a required pilot flight crew member of a civil aircraft of United 
States 
       registry unless he has in his personal possession a current pilot 
       certificate issued to him under this part. 
 
7. For example, before flight the pilot must review available information 
concerning the flight, 14 C.F.R. S 91.103 (1996), verify the aircraft's 
worthiness, 14 C.F.R. S 91.7 (1996), and ensure that passengers are 
briefed on the use of their seatbelts, 14 C.F.R. S 91.107 (1996). 
 
8. For example, according to 14 C.F.R. S 91.13, "[n]o person may operate 
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or 
property of another." 14 C.F.R. S 91.13 (1996). Furthermore 14 C.F.R. 
S 91.7 mandates that "[t]he pilot in command shall discontinue the flight 
when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur." 
 
9. 14 C.F.R. S 91.101 states: "This subpart prescribes flight rules 
governing the operation of aircraft within the United States and within 
12 nautical miles from the coast of the United States." 
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efficient use of the nation's airspace." Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 
Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 
Then, in City of Burbank, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress's consolidation of control of aviation in one 
agency indicated its intent to federally preempt aviation 
safety. 411 U.S. at 639. In reaching this decision, the Court 
first noted that the Solicitor General had conceded that 
airspace management was federally preempted. Id. at 627. 
Finding this to be a "fatal concession," the Court held that 
state noise regulation was federally preempted because of 
its interrelationship with airspace management. Id. at 627- 
28. Although he dissented in City of Burbank, Justice 
Rehnquist agreed with the majority on the issue of federal 
preemption, noting that "Congress clearly intended to pre- 
empt the States from regulating aircraft in flight." 411 U.S. 
at 644. According to Justice Rehnquist, 
 
       The 1958 Act was intended to consolidate in one 
       agency in the Executive Branch the control over 
       aviation that had previously been diffused within that 
       branch. The paramount substantive concerns of 
       Congress were to regulate federally all aspects of air 
       safety, . . . and, once aircraft were in "flight," air-space 
       management . . .. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The decision in City of Burbank, regarding federal preemption, 
affirmed sentiments that, prior to the passage of the FAA, the Court had 
expressed regarding the nature of aviation. For instance, in Northwest 
Airlines, Inc v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944), Justice Jackson, in 
a concurrence, expressed the view that federal aviation by nature admits 
to only one uniform system of safety standards. He remarked: 
 
       Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander 
       about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal 
       permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hand of federally 
       certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal 
       commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up 
       in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes off only 
by 
       instruction from the control tower, it travels on prescribed beams, 
it 
       may be diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and 
       orders. Its privileges, rights and protection, so far as transit is 
       concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and not to any 
       state governments. 
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In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 
1974), a mid-air collision case, the Seventh Circuit found 
the rights and liabilities of the parties to be federally 
preempted. The court wrote of Congress's objective in 
enacting the FAA: "[T]he principal purpose of the [FAA] is to 
create one unified system of flight rules and to centralize in 
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
the power to promulgate rules for the safe and efficient use 
of the country's airspace." Id. at 404. The court found a 
"predominant, indeed almost exclusive, interest of the 
federal government in regulating the affairs of the nation's 
airways." Id. at 403. 
 
Similarly, the Second Circuit recognized the broad scope 
of the FAA and its implied federal preemption of state air 
safety standards in British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority of 
New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977), and held that, by 
enacting the 1968 noise control amendments to the FAA, 
Congress "intended to strengthen the FAA's regulatory role 
within the area already totally preempted--control of flights 
through navigable airspace." Id. at 84; see also id. at 83 
(stating that without federal preemption, "[t]he likelihood of 
multiple, inconsistent rules would be a dagger pointed at 
the heart of commerce--and the rule applied might come 
literally to depend on which way the wind was blowing."). 
 
The understanding of the courts in these early cases that 
the FAA's broad scope implied federal preemption of 
aviation safety standards, has been affirmed over time. In 
recent decades, courts of appeals have found implied 
federal preemption of various aspects of air safety that 
states have attempted to regulate. For example, the First 
Circuit in French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st 
Cir. 1989), found pilot regulation, which related to air 
safety, to be federally preempted. Id. at 6. The court held 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
322 U.S. at 303. This statement was cited by the Court in City of 
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638. See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107 (1948) (noting that the nature 
of aviation "called for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive 
regulation by the nation than had been thought appropriate for the more 
easily controlled commerce of the past."). 
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that "such an intent is implicit in the pervasiveness of 
relevant federal regulation, the dominance of the federal 
interest, and the legislative goal of establishing a single, 
uniform system of control over air safety." Id. at 6-7. The 
court explained: 
 
       The intricate web of statutory provisions affords no 
       room for the imposition of state law criteria vis-a-vis 
       pilot suitability. We therefore conclude, without serious 
       question, that preemption is implied by the 
       comprehensive legal scheme which imposes on the 
       [Administrator] the duty of qualifying pilots for air 
       service. 
 
Id. at 4. 
 
Because the legislative history of the FAA and its judicial 
interpretation indicate that Congress's intent was to 
federally regulate aviation safety, we find that any state or 
territorial standards of care relating to aviation safety are 
federally preempted. Our analysis is sustained by reference 
to the broad scope of the FAA, described above. It also is 
supported by decisions in which courts found federal 
preemption of discrete, safety-related matters, such as 
airspace management, flight operations, and aviation noise, 
because of the promulgation of specific federal regulations 
over those aspects of air safety. See, e.g., City of Burbank, 
411 U.S. at 633; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 
651 F.2d 1306, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981); Price v. Charter 
Township, 909 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also id. 
at 1351 n.22 (citing numerous cases in which the courts 
held flight control regulation to reduce noise federally 
preempted); Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus , 76 F.3d 
778, 786 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating in dictum that "[federal] 
regulations preempt local law in regard to aircraft safety, 
the navigable airspace, and noise control"); id. at 792 
(Jones, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that local 
land and water use are not preempted, but that aviation 
safety, navigable airspace and noise control are preempted). 
 
It follows from the evident intent of Congress that there 
be federal supervision of air safety and from the decisions 
in which courts have found federal preemption of discrete, 
safety-related matters, that federal law preempts the 
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general field of aviation safety. Indeed, it would be illogical 
to conclude that, while federal law preempts state and 
territorial regulation of matters such as pilot licensing, it 
does not preempt regulations relating to the exercise of the 
specific skill for which licensing is necessary--pilots' 
operation of aircraft. 
 
Moreover, our move from specific to general regulation is 
not without support in FAA regulations themselves. For 
example, 14 C.F.R. S 91.13(a), which governs "Careless or 
Reckless Operation," supplies a comprehensive standard of 
care to be exercised by pilots and flight crew. It provides, 
"No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless 
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another." 
In a case then where there is no specific provision or 
regulation governing air safety, S 91.13(a) provides a general 
description of the standard required for the safe operation 
of aircraft. 
 
Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation 
negligence action, a court must refer not only to specific 
regulations but also to the overall concept that aircraft may 
not be operated in a careless or reckless manner. The 
applicable standard of care is not limited to a particular 
regulation of a specific area; it expands to encompass the 
issue of whether the overall operation or conduct in 
question was careless or reckless. Moreover, when a jury is 
determining what constitutes careless or reckless operation 
of an aircraft, expert testimony on various aspects of 
aircraft safety may be helpful to the jury. In the present 
case, for example, the regulations on the use of seat belts 
and on the illumination of the "fasten seat belt" sign11 set 
the standard for determining both whether American 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. FAA regulations require passengers to wear their seat belts when the 
seat belt sign is illuminated: 
 
       [T]he "Fasten Seat Belt" sign shall be turned on during any 
       movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing, and at 
       any other time considered necessary by the pilot in command. . . . 
       Each passenger . . . shall fasten his or her safety belt around him 
       or her and keep it fastened while the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign is 
       lighted. 
 
14 C.F.R. S 121.317(b), (f). 
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operated the aircraft carelessly or recklessly and whether 
the passengers, who had not fastened their seatbelts, were 
contributorily negligent. In addition, expert testimony may 
help the jury to understand whether the way in which 
warnings of turbulence and/or illumination of seatbelt 
signs were conveyed to the passengers constituted careless 
or reckless operation. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that because of the need for one, 
consistent means of regulating aviation safety, the standard 
applied in determining if there has been careless or reckless 
operation of an aircraft, should be federal; state or 
territorial regulation is preempted. 
 
B. Divergent Authority 
 
Despite the legislative history and interpreting authority 
which have informed our decision, many courts have held 
that the field of aviation safety is not federally preempted. 
We find, however, that the rationales, on which these 
courts have relied in reaching this conclusion, are 
unpersuasive. As explained below, either the courts have 
presumed, without any in-depth analysis, that the FAA 
does not preempt state or territorial air safety standards, or 
they have followed precedent involving the ADA, an 
economic deregulation statute which is inapposite to 
resolving preemption questions relating to the FAA and air 
safety. We will deal with these various rationales in turn. 
 
a. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius 
 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a Latin maxim 
which means "to express one is to exclude the other." As 
with all easy answers, it should be taken with a grain of 
salt -- or even better, with a grain of common sense. 
 
The maxim has been employed by some courts to justify 
a decision that air safety standards are not federally 
preempted. The main rationale for such a finding rests on 
Section 105(a)(1) of the ADA, which provides that the 
regulation of "rates, routes, and services" is expressly 
preempted.12 Based on the language of this section, some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Section 105(a)(1) of the ADA provides: 
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courts have observed that state tort law claims for personal 
injuries connected to airline operations are not preempted. 
See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 
(5th Cir. 1995); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. 
Supp. 318, 321-22 (E.D. Mich.1993) (holding that"nowhere 
in the legislative history or in the evolution of the [FAA] is 
there any suggestion that the preemption provision of the 
[ADA] was intended to preclude common law negligence 
actions" and collecting cases); see also American Airlines, 
Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 231, n.7 (1995) (noting that 
the United States as Amicus Curiae had conceded that"[i]t 
is ... unlikely that [the ADA] preempts safety-related 
personal injury claims relating to airplane operations"). 
Such a result may not, of course, be inconsistent with our 
determination that even with federal preemption of 
standards of care, state tort remedies are preserved. A 
number of courts have, however, continued to use the state 
law standard of care, along with state remedies. They have 
concluded that the standards of care related to aviation 
safety by implication must not be preempted because 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See, e.g., Public Health 
Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th Cir. 
1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 
1443-44 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 
We agree with American that reliance on this maxim to 
determine whether safety standards are federally preempted 
is inappropriate. This maxim "stands on the faulty premise 
that all possible alternatives or supplemental provisions 
were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative 
draftsmen." National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 
F.2d 672, 676 (D.D.C.1973). The maxim "serves only as an 
aid in discovering the legislative intent when that is not 
otherwise manifest." United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 
519 (1912). For that reason, it "can never override clear and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate 
agency or 
       other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce 
       any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the 
       force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of 
any air 
       carrier.... 49 U.S.C. S 41713(b)(1). 
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contrary evidences of Congressional intent." Neuberger v. 
Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); United States v. 
Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding 
legislative history and context indicate maxim cannot 
apply); National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 
624, 648 n.33 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that evidence of 
legislative intent renders the maxim inapplicable). 
 
As the District Court recognized in its comprehensive 
examination of the exclusio unius maxim, "the meaning of 
a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy; 
and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous 
events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed 
upon the attention of the legislative body." Church of the 
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892). 
Thus, whether the maxim should be applied to the 
standards of care for pilots, flight attendants, and 
passengers depends on Congress's intent when it enacted 
the ADA -- Congress's intent not only with respect to the 
ADA itself, but also regarding the ADA as it affected and 
interrelated with the earlier provisions of the FAA. 
 
The ADA was enacted "[t]o ensure that the States would 
not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own 
... [by] prohibiting the States from enforcing any law 
`relating to rates, routes, or services' of any air carrier." 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 
(1992). Airlines compete against one another by attracting 
passengers through the rates, routes, and services that 
they offer. Congress did not want the states to hamper this 
competition by their own regulation of these areas. Safe 
operations, however, are a necessity for all airlines. 
Whether or not to conform to safety standards is not an 
option for airlines in choosing a mode of competition. For 
this reason, safety of an airline's operations would not 
appear to fall within the ambit of the ADA and its pro- 
competition preemption clause. 
 
Moreover, as the court noted in Moreno Rios v. United 
States, 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958), "the maxim ... is pretty 
weak when applied to acts of Congress enacted at widely 
separated times." Id. at 71; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 
520 (remarking that " `the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
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one.' "(citation omitted)). The ADA was enacted 20 years 
after the FAA. Under the circumstances then of Congress's 
intent in adopting both the FAA and the ADA, we do not 
find the exclusio unius maxim helpful on the issue of 
federal preemption of aviation safety standards. 
 
b. Absence of Federal-State Law Conflict  
 
Another rationale for finding that federal law does not 
preempt state and territorial safety standards rests upon 
the observation that Congress directed the Administrator to 
prescribe "minimum standards" to promote safety. 49 
U.S.C. S 44701.13 Because the federal standards are 
"minimum," some courts have determined that a common 
law duty of safety may be owed beyond the FAA 
regulations. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 
Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 815 (2d Cir. 1994); Cleveland, 985 
F.2d at 1444-45; Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Kan. 1992); Holliday v. 
Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. 
Haw. 1990). Indeed, as the District Court pointed out in its 
preemption analysis, some courts have concluded that the 
application of state standards would raise the level of air 
safety as a supplement to the federal regulations. See, e.g., 
Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. After finding"nothing 
inconsistent with Congress' goal of maximum safety and 
common law claims," id. at 1443, the court in Cleveland 
compared the state common law duties and the federal 
regulatory framework to determine whether there was an 
actual conflict. Id. at 1444-45. Finding no conflict between 
state and federal law, it found that the state common law 
action was not preempted. Id. at 1445. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. 49 U.S.C. S 44701(a)(5) provides: 
 
       The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
       promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by 
prescribing-- 
 
       ... 
 
       (5) regulations and minimum standards for other practices, 
       methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety 
       in air commerce and national security. 
 
(emphasis added). 
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We have a problem with applying the type of analysis 
employed in Cleveland to determine that there is no federal 
preemption of aviation safety. First, as we demonstrate in 
Part III.A.1, there is no gap in the federal standards to fill 
with a state common law standard. The S 91.13(a) 
prohibition of "careless or reckless" operation of an aircraft 
occupies the apparent void beyond the specified "minimum" 
standards. Therefore, because the Administrator has 
provided both general and specific standards, there is no 
need to look to state or territorial law to provide standards 
beyond those established by the Administrator. 
 
Moreover, as the First Circuit noted in French, the lack of 
a conflict between federal standards and state law is 
irrelevant. The court in French remarked that the absence 
of a conflict was "beside the point." "So long as occupation 
of an envisioned field was intended, `any state law falling 
within th[e] field is pre-empted.' . . . The federal interest 
necessarily predominates, rendering states impotent to act." 
869 F.2d at 6 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248); see also 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 387 (holding that "[t]he pre-emption 
provision [of the ADA] ... displace[s] all state laws that fall 
within its sphere, even including state laws that are 
consistent with . . . substantive requirements."). In such 
instances, "the state statute must yield to the force of 
federal law . . . , notwithstanding that it is constructed 
upon values familiar to many and cherished by most, and 
notwithstanding that it may fit neatly within or alongside 
the federal scheme." French, 869 F.2d at 6. 
 
As a consequence, in a federally preempted area, the 
question whether state or territorial law conflicts with 
federal law is a pointless inquiry. See id. If Congress has 
preempted a field -- whether it be expressly or by 
implication -- state laws attempting to regulate within that 
field "will be invalidated no matter how well they comport 
with substantive federal policies." L. TRIBE , AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 6-27 at 497 (2d ed. 1988); see also 
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. 
 
c. The Savings and Insurance Clauses 
 
The FAA's savings clause provides that: "A remedy under 
this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by 
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law." 49 U.S.C. S 40120(c). The insurance clause requires 
that airlines maintain liability insurance "for bodily injury 
to, or death of, an individual ... resulting from the operation 
or maintenance of the aircraft." 49 U.S.C. S 41112(a). These 
two sections have been interpreted to mean that state 
safety standards are not preempted because Congress 
provided for compensation of injured persons. See, e.g., 
Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338 & n.7; see also Cleveland, 985 F.2d 
at 1442 (collecting cases in which courts relied on the 
savings clause to find no preemption of state common law). 
 
These two sections do demonstrate that Congress 
intended to allow for compensation of persons who were 
injured in aviation mishaps. As we point out in our answer 
to the second part of the certified question, however, we do 
not find that state and territorial law remedies are 
preempted, only the standards of care for the safe operation 
of aircraft. For that reason, the inclusion of the savings and 
insurance clauses in the FAA is not inconsistent with our 
decision. Their inclusion as a part of the FAA is in fact 
compatible with our determination that state and territorial 
damage remedies are preserved. 
 
d. Reserved State Power 
 
Finally, as the District Court pointed out, some courts 
have found that federal law does not preempt state law in 
the field of aviation safety because they believe that states 
may regulate aviation safety under their traditional police 
powers. See, e.g., Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443; Kiefer v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 496, 505 (Tex. App. 
1994). However, whether the states may invoke their police 
powers depends on whether the field is federally preempted. 
See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441 ("Consideration of issues 
arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'.") (quoting 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citation omitted); accord 
Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338. 
 
As a result, because we have found that the entirefield 
of aviation safety is federally preempted, we need not 
consider whether the regulation of aviation safety falls 
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within the traditional police powers of the states and 
territories. 
 
C. No Federal Preemption of State and 
   Territorial Remedies 
 
Even though we have found federal preemption of the 
standards of aviation safety, we still conclude that the 
traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to 
exist for violation of those standards. Federal preemption of 
the standards of care can coexist with state and territorial 
tort remedies. For instance, in Silkwood, the Supreme 
Court held that a state tort remedy can coexist with federal 
preemption of the regulation of nuclear safety. 464 U.S. at 
256. The Court in Silkwood held that "insofar as damages 
for radiation injuries are concerned, preemption should not 
be judged on the basis that the Federal Government has so 
completely occupied the field of safety that state remedies 
are foreclosed, but on whether there is an irreconcilable 
conflict between the federal and state standards or whether 
the imposition of a state standard in a damages action 
would frustrate the objectives of the federal law." Id. 
 
In the present case, we find no "irreconcilable conflict 
between federal and state standards." Nor do wefind that 
"imposition of a [territorial] standard in a damages action 
would frustrate the objectives of the federal law." Quite to 
the contrary, it is evident in both the savings and the 
insurance clauses of the FAA that Congress found state 
damage remedies to be compatible with federal aviation 
safety standards. The savings clause provides that "a 
remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies 
provided by law." Clearly, Congress did not intend to 
prohibit state damage remedies by this language. Moreover, 
the insurance clause requires airlines to maintain liability 
insurance "for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual 
. . . resulting from the operation or maintenance of the 
aircraft." 49 U.S.C. S 41112(a). Congress could not have 
intended to abolish a damage remedy for injury or death if 
it required airlines to maintain insurance coverage to 
recompense injured persons. Furthermore, there is no 
federal remedy for personal injury or death caused by the 
operation or maintenance of aircraft to be found in the FAA 
itself. See In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 408 
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(9th Cir. 1983). We must conclude, therefore, that the 
insurance proceeds are to be available as a remedy under 
state or territorial law. See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Co., 
691 P.2d 630, 634-35 (1984) ("[T]here is nothing inherently 
inconsistent in the proposition that even if the federal 
government has entirely occupied the field of regulating an 
activity a state may simultaneously grant damages for 
violation of such regulations.") 
 
The Court in Silkwood recognized nevertheless that an 
inherently regulatory effect is created by a state law damage 
remedy. 464 U.S. at 258. Accord Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521; 
Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441. The Silkwood Court observed, 
however, that Congress had decided to "tolerate whatever 
tension there was" between finding the standard of care 
preempted and allowing state remedies, and that the 
"regulatory consequence [of an award of damages] was 
something that Congress was quite willing to accept." 464 
U.S. at 256. Similarly, with aviation safety, in light of the 
Silkwood decision, we cannot infer from Congress's intent 
to federally preempt the standards of care, that Congress 
also intended to bar state and territorial tort remedies. See 
id. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
in Bieneman v. City of Chicago: 
 
       The identity of common law damages and penalties for 
       disobedience to substantive rules could lead to a 
       conclusion that where a state is forbidden to alter the 
       substantive rule, it is forbidden to award damages. 
       Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee rejects this equation, however. 
       . . . Notwithstanding the argument (indeed the truism) 
       that an award of hefty compensatory and punitive 
       damages is a method of regulating safety, the Court 
       concluded that federal law does not preempt common 
       law remedies concerning nuclear safety. 
 
864 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Elsworth, 691 
P.2d at 635 (holding that "in spite of the fact that federal 
law may have completely occupied the field of regulation of 
aircraft safety . . . remedies that a party may have under 
state law" are not abridged by the FAA); cf. TMI III, 67 F.3d 
at 1107 (holding that even though federal law controlled the 
standard of care in the regulation of nuclear safety, the 
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question whether a damages remedy for injured persons 
was federally preempted was a separate consideration). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Because we find Congress's intent to regulate interstate 
and international air safety to be unambiguous, we hold 
that state and territorial standards of care in aviation safety 
are federally preempted. Moreover, we find that state and 
territorial tort remedies can coexist with federal standards 
of care for air safety; thus, plaintiffs, who are injured 
during a flight as a result of the violation of federal air 
safety standards, may have a remedy in state or territorial 
law. 
 
We will remand this case to the District Court to evaluate 
whether the evidence on standards of care and the 
instructions given to the jury conformed to the federal 
aviation safety standards as we have described them, and 
for such further proceedings as it may deem necessary. 
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